Contemporary Social Theory Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Contemporary Social Theory - Essay Example It is not possible to discard the classical theories because modern theories have to branch out of them and as the society is a continuous story, classical theories remain forever relevant. Also we require social theories that could combine and understand many cultures and regional specialities. To understand the demography, social class structure, population, law and justice matters, sociological network and sociological geography it is necessary to have easily applicable social theories. It enables culture mapping, research, social justice and the requirements of a social welfare state. It is necessary to analyse the complexities of contemporary societies, and to understand the present social world. It is necessary to theorise communication between social systems, social interaction, and hierarchies. It is also significant to understand the configuration of power points like global trends, media and shifting political issues. Mills argues that social theory has to be combined with social imagination that shows how the personal issues could affect the large scale social structures: â€Å"Issues have to do with matters that transcend these local environments of the individual and the range of his inner life. They have to do with the organisation of many such milieux into the institution of a historical society as a whole, with the ways in which various milieux overlap and interpenetrate to form the larger structure of social and historical life,† Mills (1959, p.15). Interpreting September 11th in terms of social theory is not easy. Calhoun et al (2002, P.24) argue: â€Å"The terrorist attacks have stimulated public soul-searching. Both attacks and responses to them have raised a host of questions about social organisations, basic social institutions, and how people mobilize amid crises.† Harrington covers both classical and contemporary social theories in his book Modern Social Theory. Harrington

Analysis NASA Challenger Case Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 1

Analysis NASA Challenger Case - Essay Example Administrators owe their loyalty to the employees, students, school districts and the parents. Employees rely on the information given to them by the administrators. In addition, parents have trusted the administrators to protect their children. Moreover, school districts have mandated the administrators to achieve laid down goals and objectives. Finally, students expect administrators to ensure their safety and quality service delivery to them. In order for the administration to protect their relationship with employees, they give this type of recommendation when getting rid of their employees. They give an employee a chance of another employment by another institution. In most cases friendship tend to have outdo honesty. Administrators tend to offer half-truths about their employees due to friendship. However, that not ought to be the case. Honesty in the workplace is fundamental, since it ensures that there is trust among the administrators. In addition, honest information makes one to make right decisions. In the Gadam’s case, the administrators said nothing about Gadam’s behavior. This may have been due to the friendship that existed between the administrators and Gadam. Moreover, due to the fear of tarnishing the reputation of the institutions by a negative recommendation letter about one of their employee. In the NASA case, the managers are fully responsible for the explosion. Despite their knowledge in engineering and the reasons the engineers gave against the launch, they adamantly gave an okay for the launch of the rocket. In addition, they decided to throw their engineering knowledge to the wind and embrace the management skills. I would have tried to persuade the managers not to launch the rocket, if I was in the position of McDonald or Boisjoly. Moreover, I could have warned the six astronauts and Christa McAuliffe about the danger they were about to get

Law Heritage of International Law

Law Heritage of International Law International law theorists are largely in agreement when discussing the natural law heritage of International Law. The two were virtually synonymous until the nineteenth century.[1] The conception of International Law as a branch of law is often associated with Hugo Grotius, the celebrated natural law theorist, which is a testament to the undeniable link. This was also due in part to the underdevelopment of international positive law, the relative absence of recognised customary international law and treaties, such as we enjoy today. This void was instead filled by natural law, which had matured over some two millennia. Natural law has often been referred to as philisophia perennis by some scholars.[2] Therefore, the common ground that legal systems share has been cultivated under natural law, and similarly, the common ground for the genesis of an international legal system had also been natural law. By the thirteenth century natural law had reached its zenith with the works of Thomas Aquinas. However, it was not until much later, the middle of the twentieth century to be more precise, until legal positivism became hegemonic. This was a result of post-enlightenment European thought and the rise of thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke who provided fresh insights into philosophy as well as governance. Fresh thought brought with it fresh reaction for and against the work of the naturalistic school of jurisprudence. The criticisms came from within the naturalist tradition due to a divergence from the original lex naturalis, as well as out with from the positivists.[3] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, attempts to successfully establish international law within the positivist framework proved futile. At first it was decisively excluded from the realm of positivist jurisprudence, following which it sought to reclaim it on its own terms. Lon Fuller has appropriately described thi s approach as one of icy rejection and [then] an acceptance in a bone-crushing embrace.[4] The unacceptance of international law by the legal positivists, at least initially, was due to the latters unwavering loyalty to legal positivisms core tenets. Despite numerous attempts by positivists, they were simply dumbfounded at the possibility of an object with so-called juridical character which did not stem from the will of a sovereign. By the start of the twentieth century the tide had well and truly turned in favour of legal positivism. This ushered in a new era on the jurisprudence of international law, which was rather glibly summed up in a 1926 opinion of the Mexico-United States General Claims Commission: The law of nature may have been helpful, some three centuries ago, to build up a new law of nations, and the conception of inalienable rights of men and nations may have exercised a salutary influence, some one hundred and fifty years ago, on the development of modern democracy on both sides of the ocean; but they have failed as durable foundation of either municipal or international law and can not be used in the present day as substitutes for positive municipal law, on the one hand, and for positive international law, as recognised by nations and government through their acts and statements, on the other hand.[5] As the eighteenth century drew to a close, so did the window to what was now a dated philosophy in the field of jurisprudence natural law. This was largely down to a continental shift toward proper science. This new dawn in European civilisation left little room for conjecture and ideas of a capricious nature. In other words, scholarly credibility lay in forming ideas based on a methodology akin to that of the natural sciences. Over a relatively short space of time international law theorists tipped their proverbial hats to natural law for its immense contribution to the field of international law and gave up conjecture for observation, and analysis in place of evaluation. Two of the most important figures in the history of legal positivism were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and, his compatriot John Austin (1790-1859). Austin is a distinguished and celebrated figure in the positivist tradition because of his innovations in English legal thought. His works have been praised far and wide, and perhaps by none more so than the Cambridge jurist T.A Walker (1862-1935) who pronounced Austins work as the starting point of all English dissertations on legal science.[6] In the hope of extending jurisprudence the same status as that of the natural sciences, Austin was resolute in his stance on the distinction between law and ethics. With said task in mind, Austin provides a succinct account of what defines positive law: The essential difference of a positive law (or the difference that severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated thus. Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme.[7] However, regarding international law, Austin adopts a different tact. In an attempt to offer an explanation to the enigma that is international law, Austin decides to head it under the science of positive morality as opposed to law properly so called. His reasoning stems from international laws apparent unfulfillment of the criteria put forth by legal positivism. Austin believes international law to be materially lacking in the sense that no laws strictly so called emanate from a sovereign to members of an independent political society. Therefore, since there is no sovereign and independent political community which is in turn subject to said sovereign, then international law is not law so properly called.[8] The need for a sovereign in Austins view is largely due to the power it affords the law. He believes the obligatory status conferred upon the law is a result of the possible punishment, by the sovereign, that may befall a wrongdoer in case of disobedience: the prior of which is not bound by any law and is the source of all law properly so called. The notion of all law being dependent on the will of a sovereign state is one that is entirely mismatched to the characterisation of international as a proper legal system. This concept seeks to preclude the very possibility of any form of real governance of international relations amongst sovereign nations. This rather seems a case of square pegs and round holes. It is perhaps the narrow mindedness of attempting to fit international law in an entirely uncompromising mould. This approach fails to connect with the reality of international life. Which is evident in the fact that states continue to respect international law as law; through their acceptance of the rulings in the vast majority of cases, through upholding diplomacy, exercising legal rights and accepting others legal rights as well as signing treaties and regarding themselves and others as being bound by those treaties. An alternative perspective to the absolute expulsion of international law from the positivist arena, is one posited by H.L.A Hart. In his view the rules of international law need only be accepted as standards of conduct and supported with appropriate forms of social pressure to be regarded as obligatory, binding, legal rules.[9] However, since there is no secondary rule which stipulates the criteria of legal validity of rules, their existence depends on whether they are accepted as a rule or not.[10] International law therefore consists of rules which constitute not a system but a set of rules.[11] Albeit this line of reasoning is more accepting of international law as a binding, obligatory force, it does contain a major caveat. Whilst conceding international does indeed exist as law, Hart does not afford it the same status as that of a municipal legal system, which he considers to be more advanced and acceptable to the standards of positivist thought. This presents a dilemma for int ernational lawyers: to accept Harts reductionist methodology or is international law deserving of a more comprehensive designation in the jurisprudential sphere. As discussed previously, international law owes a great deal to natural law for laying the foundation for a system that is now known as international law. However, due to its metaphysical nature it was unable to ground itself as a science properly so called. In the post-enlightenment era, the baton of jurisprudence was passed over to the now favoured legal positivism. This is where we initiate proceedings into the correct classification of international law. Chapter 2: International Law as Law: An Academic Glass Bead Game? The classification of law is a concern of the utmost gravity for the international lawyer, as this has the ability to influence perceptions about the field, which is a hugely significant factor in the reaction it invokes when infringed. Perhaps the most imperative question on the minds of those who doubt international system as a legal system is the quality of it.[12] Too often it is the case that international lawyers adopt an argumentative tact which ultimately proves to be a futile endeavour, because the question remains unanswered.[13] With the introduction of his celebrated work, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined,[14]John Austin has yielded great influence over the jurisprudence of international law: most notably because of the command theory. Austin proposed theory was as follows: law consists of rules which are issued by a sovereign; are defined as commands, coercive orders, or wishes; backed by the threat of imposing an evil in the form of a sanction in case of non-compliance with said command, coercive order, or wish.[15] In Austins view a material condition for a rule to elevate to a law is that it must be issued by a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by the majority of a society and who himselfÂÂ   does not habitually obey another human superior.[16] As is evident, the command theory precludes international law from the ambit of law. According to Austin international law is not sourced from the command of a sovereign but rather it is set by general opinion and enforced by sanctions that equate t o a mere moral duty.[17] Therefore, international law is outside the legal positivist tradition and is reduced to a form of international morality by Austin.[18] As a result of Harts effective repudiation of Austins command theory,[19] which had proven to be a formidable hindrance in recognising international law as law has been largely abandoned. Austin can be considered as the last significant denier of the legal quality of international law and the refutation of one of his most notable theories has provided some much-needed respite to the international law is law camp. However, the debate is still very much alive and kicking as there have always been and still are approaches which neither fully discount international law nor accept it as the finished article for the purposes of international politics. The legal realists such as Georg Schwarzenberger and Hans Joachim Morgenthau, illustrate this well by decreeing it as a reality of the international system but vehemently questioning its ability to kerb power exercised by states.[20] To the same effect, Kenneth Waltzs neo-realist account of international relations entirely omits any part play ed by international law.[21] More recently a fresh challenge has been posed by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner in their work The Limits of International Law, who argue that a states interests, above all else, is the determinative factor regarding its compliance with international obligations.[22]ÂÂ   Thereby claiming that international law in all its might has little to do with state conduct in the international arena. It can be said that the various ways in which the legal quality of international law is brought into question is not ultimately decided upon the basis of the jurisprudential question of whether international law really is law properly so called. However, such questions do fuel the fire of doubt which lends itself it to strengthening the position of commentators who seek to endorse a more restrictive approach to the international legal order. The benefit of clarifying international laws position through an analytical framework is two-fold: it can help explain the system better, and perhaps rather more importantly, it can aid the international lawyer in correctly identifying and interpreting the law.[23] Thus permitting a seemingly theoretical endeavour to yield practical results. The Significance of Hart in Particular The mere fact that analytical jurisprudence is of great importance in fashioning a well-reasoned answer to our proposed question does not alone merit an exhaustive engagement with Harts concept of international law. However, for a multitude of additional reasons it seems a conducive exercise, not least of all from the perspective of international law, to analyse Harts theory. As previously stated, Hart carried out the repudiation of Austins attempt to diminish international law to mere international morality. Further to this, positivism is considered by commentators on the subject of international law to be one of the most influential theoretical approaches.[24] In the same vein, it seems only natural to examine the works of one who is not only one of the most influential contemporary legal positivists, but also one of the very few legal theorists who was concerned with approaching international law from the perspective of analytical jurisprudence. There is a prevalent belief that the study of positivism within international law has now reached the stage of flogging a dead horse. This notion is somewhat misconceived when Hart is the theorist in question. Whose concept of positivism saw fit to move away from the consideration that one could gauge the validity of a legal system with the will of sovereign states. The late 19th century and early 20th century positivist accounts of international law were essentially voluntarist theories of international law. This is evident in the works of classical positivist such as Georg Jellinek, who viewed the basis for obligations under international law as an act of auto-limitation by states,[25] and Heinrich Triepel, who further developed this voluntarist theory replacing the will of the individual states with the common will of states.[26] This voluntarist approach found its basis on the landmark Lotus decision of the Permanent Court of Justice in which the court held that [i]nternational l aw governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law.[27] Therefore, positivism not only gives a firm nod of approval toward state sovereignty but also displays a belief in the consensual character of international law: no state can be bound by a rule of international law unless it has explicitly or tacitly consented to it. The historically strong affiliation between legal positivism and voluntarist conceptions of international law has led many scholars to believe that positivism is essentially a voluntarist approach to international law.[28] However this signals a tunnel vision to legal positivism, which in the international law arena does not have to be equated with voluntarism.[29] At the crux of legal positivism, there is an assertion that all legal facts are determined by social facts alone.[30] However, a point of disagreement arises when the question of what those social facts are is posed. For Jellinek and Triepel it was the will of states, for Kelsen it was the Grundnorm,[31] for Hart the rule of recognition. Positivism can be considered a malleable concept of law, as it has the ability to encompass an approach to international law which overcomes the constrictive nuances of voluntarism. Learning from Austins Mistakes: A Critique of the Command Theory Hart believed that the major defect with Austins theory lay in its promulgation of understanding law as a set of rules which had been issued by a sovereign. Based on this contention Hart began his work, by refuting both Austins theory on rules and his proposed theory on sovereignty. Respectively, Hart was unsatisfied with the explanation of labelling all legal rules as coercive orders. Whilst the fact was true that such a theory could provide the basis for understanding certain branches of the law, namely criminal law and delict/tort, it fails to take into consideration power-conferring rules. The latter of which do not encumber individuals, but rather they are utilised in finding and altering legal relations or granting powers to public officials.[32] Hart believes that homogenising power-conferring rules with orders backed by threats has given rise to a misnomer commands which has distorted the difference.[33] An additional concern with this characterisation is that it provides n o explanation for a scenario in which the sovereign can issue law which binds himself.[34] Lastly, Hart states that it would be baseless to suppose that all legal rules can source their origin to a wilful act of a legislator, especially with regards to customary law.[35] The role accorded to a sovereign in Austins theory is highly disputed by Hart. Who finds the concept to be overreaching in the sense that the sovereign issues orders, which are habitually obeyed, and who himself obeys no one else. The issue, as Hart states, arises with respect to the continuity of law. This common ideal cannot be upheld under habitual obedience.[36] That is to say, Austins theory fails to explain the effect of a new lawmakers particular powers because the basis of his theory rests on the normative supposition of habitual obedience, which it is not.ÂÂ   This in turn cannot lend itself to a successful transfer of law making powers to the new legislator. Therefore, Hart posits that past habitual obedience is no guarantee of future habitual obedience to a new sovereign.[37]Further to this, the command theory also neglects to clarify the persistence of law.[38] Which begs the question: if a command by a person who was habitually obeyed is no longer in power, what leg al value does the command retain, if any at all. Hitherto, it is one of the defining features of a legal system that laws passed by a legislator retain their power long after the legislator waives his position. Lastly, the influence granted by Austins theory to the sovereign disregards legal limitations faced by a legislature.[39] Austin suggests that the legislator may only face legal limitations if said legislator is under obligation to another legislator. This has the undesired effect of not only undermining the sovereignty of a legislator but rather removing it altogether due to his subjection to another sovereign.[40] Therefore, removing the possibility of law being understood as the will of a sovereign.[41] Chapter 3: Harts Fresh Start: Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules From the criticism of Austin, Hart forges a fresh approach in the form of primary and secondary rules. The lack of explanation offered by Austin on the subject of power-conferring rules acts as a catalyst for Hart to introduce and explain the difference between primary and secondary rules.[42] At the crux of it, primary rules impose duties on individuals. Whereas secondary rules provide the basis for creating, altering and defining the ambit of primary rules and are more commonly known as power-conferring rules. In his endeavour to demonstrate the requirement of secondary rules, Hart puts forth the example of a primitive society, which although follows certain customary rules, it does not fulfil the requisites for a legal system.[43] The system in such a society will no doubt have rudimentary regulations that facilitate its governance, but it will ultimately lack the power or means to authoritatively alter rules and resolve disputes arising from said rules. In Harts view, such a system would only be able to satisfy a relatively cognate society, and would not be agreeable if replicated on a larger scale.[44] The system of rules would suffer from rigidity in the face of social change as there would be no identifiable way to authoritatively alter them; uncertainty would arise surrounding the effectiveness of rules as there would be no means to monitor their efficiency. To address the issues facing primary rules, Hart proposes a system in which they are accompanied by secondary rules.[45] Harts rule of recognition would mitigate uncertainty and problems in authoritatively identifying primary rules. Further to this, rules of change would make the system more adept by vesting power in an individual or a group of individuals to readily create new primary rules when necessary. Lastly, the rules of adjudication would grant the representative powers to adjudicate authoritatively on possible violations of primary rules, thereby overcoming the inefficiency of a primitive system. The rule of recognition can be described as the defining characteristic of Harts concept of law. He believed it to be at the core of a legal system, as it lends authority to primary rules.[46] In contemporary legal systems, the rule of recognition dictates the precedence afforded to varying criterion.[47] The supreme criterion amongst them, must be one that overarches all other sources of law. Therefore, the rule of recognition, is the ultimate decider in a legal system.[48] Thereby granting it the unique position of not having to source its origins back to any other rule in a legal system, unlike every other criterion which is subject to the rule of recognition. In short, it serves as the standard bearer for every other rule and is perpetual in its existence. In order to establish a workable template for a legal system that amalgamates primary and secondary rules, Hart lays out the foundational aspects for such a system.[49] An elemental criteria according to Hart, is one of general obedience to the primary rules by the citizens. On the other hand, Hart rejects the assumption of secondary rules being obeyed by public officials, to whom they are addressed. This seems an amicable stance, as it would be unintelligible to class their conformity to the rules which confer law making powers on them as obedience or when they fail to conform, as disobedience. Let us consider the example of a judge, who in his duty of identifying and applying a statue, obeys the rule of recognition. It hardly seems an appropriate description of his task. Consequently, the rule of recognition requires unanimous acceptance by public officials according to Hart.[50] Whereas primary rules need only be accepted by the citizens to be considered legally valid, the rule of recognition is reliant on the fact that public officials believe it to be the general standard of legal validity and enact it to that degree.[51] Basic Elements of Harts Concept of International Law On the basis of his general theory Hart develops his concept of international law in Chapter X of The Concept of Law. In this chapter Hart approaches the question whether international law constitutes law or international morality. Only in the last section of Chapter X does Hart ask whether international law is sufficiently analogous to the municipal legal order to be qualified as a legal system. International Law as Law? According to Hart, international law lacks certain features which place it outside the fold of a developed legal system. He believes this ascription to be merited on the basis of; lack of an international legislature, absence of courts with sufficient authority, and the inadequacy of centrally organised sanctions.[52] In his estimation, such shortcomings ultimately consign international law to the position of a simple form of social structure, found in primitive societies.ÂÂ   Thereby giving rise to Harts claim that international law is largely made up of primary rules with little in the way of secondary rules. Hart goes on to examine the consequence of a lack of centralized sanctions, more notably, the effect this has on the classification of international law as law. In his view, not only are there no such sanctions under international law, United Nations Security Council attempts to establish them under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be an exercise in futility as the veto would prove to be an unsurmountable challenge.[53]On the other hand, Hart does not believe sanctions are the elemental factor in states satisfying their obligations under international law. Such a belief would stem from the command theory obligations being backed by the threat of sanctions in case of disobedience which Hart had already refuted. Similarly, Hart argues that in establishing primary rules which prohibit the free use of force and providing rules for the use of force on official grounds as a sanction, are essential traits for all municipal legal systems. Such a system derives logic from the fact that human beings are based in communities, are of roughly equal strength, and have innumerable opportunities to harm their counterparts, all of which requires an approach that goes beyond relying on mere natural deterrents.[54] On the other hand, the international stage presents a different situation altogether. International acts of aggression are very well documented compared with those that occur on a domestic level between individuals. The possibility of third parties getting involved and the unpredictable nature of war, more often than not, acts as reason enough for states to avoid violence. Moreover, all states are not equal with regards to power and strength.[55] That is to say, sanctions would offer little in the way of acting as a deterrent for powerful states or forcing such states to obey the rules.[56] The absence of sanctions from the international level is of little concern to the legal quality of international law. [1] Sir Fredrick Pollock, Essays in the Law (1922) 63. [2] Philosophia perenis: This term has been used to denote the collective works of, most notably: Aristotle, the stoics, Augustine, the scholastics, and more latterly the neo-scholastics and the neo-thomists, referring to the body of philosophical truths common across ages and civilisations. See Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy (1946: 1998 edition translated by Thomas R. Hanley) 27-2, note 21. [3] Sir Fredrick Pollock remarking on the damage done by some scholars in the Enlightenment period post-Rousseau to natural law: Modern aberrations have led to a widespread belief that the Law of Nature is only a cloak for arbitrary dogmas or fancies. Essays in the Law (1922) 32. [4] Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1969 revised edition) 232. [5] North American Dredging Company of Texas (USA) v. Mexico, 4 RIAA 26, at 29-30 (1926). [6] T.A Walker, The Science of International Law *1893) 4.

Indecision, Hesitation and Delay in Shakespeares Hamlet - Procrastinat

Hamlet – the Hesitation and Indecision  Ã‚        Ã‚  Ã‚   Is there a plausible explanation for the hesitation by Hamlet in carrying out the ghost’s request in Shakespeare’s Hamlet?    Lawrence Danson in the essay â€Å"Tragic Alphabet† discusses the hesitation in action by the hero; this is related to his hesitation in speech:    To speak or act in a world where all speech and action are equivocal seeming is, for Hamlet, both perilous and demeaning, a kind of whoring. The whole vexed question of Hamlet’s delay ought, I believe, to be considered in light of this dilemma. To a man alienated from his society’s most basic symbolic modes, who finds all speech and action mere seeming and hypocritical playing, comes an imperious demand to speak and act – to express himself in deed his father’s son. The ghost’s stress upon ritual modes indicates that the expression demanded must not be just â€Å"a kind of wild justice,† but an expression ordered and meaningful. Hamlet’s difficulties at the linguistic level – his puns and â€Å"antic disposition,† the lack of commensurate values between him and the rest of the court – are reflected in his difficulties at the level of action (72).    In â€Å"Acts III and IV: Problems of Text and Staging† Ruth Nevo explains how the protagonist is â€Å"confounded† in both the prayer scene and the closet scene:    In the prayer scene and the closet scene his [Hamlet’s] devices are overthrown. His mastery is confounded by the inherent liability of human reason to jump to conclusions, to fail to distinguish seeming from being. He, of all people, is trapped in the fatal deceptive maze of appearances that is the phenomenal world. Never perhaps has the mind’s finitude been better dramatized than in the praye... ...xcerpted from Stories from Shakespeare. N. p.: E. P. Dutton, 1956.    Danson, Lawrence. â€Å"Tragic Alphabet.† Modern Critical Interpretations: Hamlet. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House, 1986. Rpt. from Tragic Alphabet: Shakespeare’s Drama of Language. N. p.: Yale University Press, 1974.    Levin, Harry. General Introduction. The Riverside Shakespeare. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974.    Nevo, Ruth. â€Å"Acts III and IV: Problems of Text and Staging.† Modern Critical Interpretations: Hamlet. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986. Rpt. from Tragic Form in Shakespeare. N.p.: Princeton University Press, 1972.    Shakespeare, William. The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1995. http://www.chemicool.com/Shakespeare/hamlet/full.html No line nos.      

All My Sons by Arthur Miller Essay

Explain how Arthur Miller makes this moment in his play All My Sons so dramatic. Refer to Extract 6 for passage In his play All My Sons, Arthur Miller makes the moment of George Deever’s arrival highly dramatic through the sense that a crisis looms for the Kellers and is then narrowly avoided. Hostility is reduced to calm and jovial equanimity through Kate Keller’s maternal dominance and controlling nature, and this in turn ensures that the threat posed by George is negated. At first, the interactions between Chris and George are adversarial as Chris repudiates the truth George asserts. Kate Keller resists Chris too, though in a very different way, which is ultimately successful in nullifying George and the threat he represents to the false reality of Joe Keller’s innocence. The initial interactions in this passage create a hostile atmosphere that arises from the clash between George Deever and Chris Keller. George has arrived to insist that Ann does not marry Chris because Joe’s guilt, or, more particularly, Joe’s dishonesty about his guilt, resulted in their father’s imprisonment and the destruction of their family. Chris insists that George â€Å"won’t say anything now.† He intends to marry Ann and, more importantly, has systematically suppressed any doubts about his father’s innocence. Miller has George speak past him to Ann, â€Å"you’re coming with me,† he says, and again, â€Å"you’re coming with me.† This repetition in his dialogue conveys his tenacity and suggests that he’s unlikely to desist. His challenge to Chris is part of a larger challenge to the false reality in which the Keller’s have been living, a reality in which Joe is innocent. Kate has protected thi s reality for years and proceeds to do so again now. When Kate Keller enters she immediately adopts a tone of maternal care and concern toward George. â€Å"Rais[ing] both hands† she â€Å"comes†¦ toward him† saying â€Å"Georgie, Georgie.† This diminutive calls into the present George’s past, his childhood and the happy associations he would have attached to Kate Keller during that time. Miller’s stage directions describe how she â€Å"cups his face,† a gesture suggestive of the affection and intimacy between a mother and young son. She remarks that he has become â€Å"grey† and that â€Å"he looks like a ghost.† This dialogue paints a vivid image of George as a gaunt and almost lifeless figure deserving of pity and perhaps plays on any feelings of self-pity he might have. She declares that she will â€Å"make [him] a sandwich,† and insists that he is â€Å"going to sit here and drink some juice.† Her theatrical and almost hyperbolic performance is one that seeks to emphasise her concern for George’s well-being and the motherly desire to nourish him and see him in good health. George is not actually her son, instead he belongs to the now fractured and dysfunctional Deever family. There’s a real sense that Kate is playing on this. She works to establish the nature of her interaction with George as obviously maternal, and thereby implicitly encourages him to adopt the corresponding role of dependant and grateful son. Moreover, Kate works to displace both George’s mother and Ann as the female figure to whom George owes the most loyalty and thereby establishes her own dominance and control. â€Å"What’s the matter with your mother,† she asks, â€Å"why don’t she feed you?† This question undermines George’s mother as a capable maternal provider. Next, Miller has her takes aim at Ann, admonishing her for saying that George was â€Å"fine† since he so demonstrably is not. Just as George’s mother supposedly fails to nurture him, Kate points out a similar failing in Ann when she notices Ann hasn’t given George grape juice. Ann says â€Å"defensively† that she â€Å"offered it to him.† The stage direction that describes her tone as â€Å"defensive† makes it clear that she feels as though she is under attack. And indeed she is. Kate’s reply is said â€Å"scoffingly,† showing that she is ridiculing Ann for her apparently inept attempts to adequately care for her brother. By undermining both George’s mother and sister, Kate implicitly offers herself as the female figure on whom George can really depend. Ultimately, Kate succeeds and Chris defers to her utterly. Hostility dissolves into amiability and affection. Miller makes it clear from the beginning that George â€Å"always liked† Kate. This stage direction reveals a vulnerability he has in regard to her. At first he is gently dismissive of her, saying â€Å"I know† and â€Å"I feel all right.† This dialogue suggests he isn’t buying into her performance, or at least not at first. Eventually, however, he declares â€Å"Kate, I feel hungry already.† This line signals a crucial shift. It is so obviously said with affection and good humour. Clearly, the thought of doing anything to hurt Kate could not be further from his mind. Moreover, it indicates that he has adopted the role into which she has been cajoling him; that is, the dependent and acquiescent son. Throughout this passage Kate is highly manipulative. She is motivated by an instinct to protect the false reality she and Joe perpetuate and on which she depends if she is to see her husband as anything but a monster who killed their son, Larry. Her success hinges on quelling George and the uncertainty of this is what creates the angst-ridden drama at this moment in the play. Ultimately, of course, her success is only momentary.

Environmental Dumping Essay

The natural resources that a country controls are integral factors in one’s growth and success. If these natural resources are translated into something useful and are properly appropriated while being maintained in a healthy state, can bring in so much revenues and benefits to a country. Thus, it is of great importance that nation’s leaders take massive measures of protecting the natural resources that their countries possess. More so, international leaders should make it a point that the awareness for harnessing sound environmental policies is being enforced. This however, if not done, might impede the growth not only of a certain country’s national economy, but may turn in international economic losses as well. However, given this considerably enormous importance that the environment plays in a nation’s success, more often than not it is one of the most neglected areas in a country’s development. The past two decades, the calls for environmental justice grew louder and louder. Most of the injustices done against natural resources are mostly hastened by human’s aggressions. In search for various ways of generating economic prosperity, humans, in particular nation’s leaders have overlooked the necessity to maintain proper environmental precautions that shall keep natural resources in a fine state (Adeola, 2000, p. 687). In a globalized world wherein the human consumption is reaching far end level in all countries especially the more advanced ones, international waste dumping poses a great problem. More than the issue of high rate consumption there is, dumping of wastes has been more critical than ever. It reaches far more issues in the aspect of environmental justice and human rights. The issue of environmental justice and human rights are interconnected. Leaders of more advanced and powerful nations have used their superiority to manipulate international policies related to environmental issues in such a way that they get the upper hand and the benefits from the weaker states’ natural resources. In most cases, environmental policies are maneuvered in such a way that it rather serves as genocidal acts to legally drive away minority groups so that their natural resources and lands may be appropriated in accordance to the wants and wishes of wealthy nations (Adeola, 2000, p. 687). Accordingly, given that industrialized nations have a greater share in the world consumption, hence they should be the first entities who are ought to be responsible for cleaning their wastes. But nonetheless, weak nations suffer the blunder of having to become dumpsites for advanced countries against their will. With the fact that advanced countries can manipulate rules to satisfy their needs, weak countries can be legally forced to receive industrial wastes from first world countries (Adeola, 2000, pp. 688-689). Powerful nations have seized the privilege of gaining economic benefits, while they have successfully and painstakingly avoided the responsibility for their own wastes (Adeola, 2000, pp. 688-689). Strong countries would usually use their influence over the international economic arena to forcefully use other countries as dumpsites of the waste generated in industrialized nations. And given that most of the countries worldwide have adhered to the tenets of globalization, most of the poor nations voluntarily submitted to the idea that they have to willfully succumb to the calls of more industrialized nations, thus accepting the idea to serve as industrial dumpsites. Thus giving weak nations the brunt of bearing the dismal effect for their environment and natural resources, that at most times have not been generated int heir countries. Though there are certain conventions/policies which have been set up to control this alarming irresponsible dumping of wastes, still, there are blunders that can be pointed out. In addition to waste dumping, another issue that should worry the international community is the trading of recyclable wastes. Although the Basel Convention is bound to formulate policies geared towards setting a standard on trading of wastes, more often than not, these policies favor richer nations. In effect, the Basel Convention has not been so successful in regulating waste trades. The definitions that it has set out are vague and often do not coincide with the nation’s own set of definitions. For example, a hazardous waste according to the Basel Convention may not be considered hazardous for a particular country, therefore completely not abiding with it. Thus, these inconsistencies make these definitions and policies unfit for use (Alter, 1994, pp. 109-110). In addition, different countries have opposed the Basel Convention to its use arguing that the possible banning of waste trade can harm their economy. Most of the countries, both the developed and developing nations, that halting the trade will serve grave effects on their economy. First, developed nations could lose an ample amount of economic profits if they lose the chance of dumping their wastes on poorer countries. And on the other hand, the claim of less developed nations that they can only afford second hand materials to be used in their industries, rather than generating raw materials of their own which are more extravagant to produce (Alter, 1994, pp. 111-112). Moreover, recent data and statistics are able to show the manner at which waste dumping has been proven to serve distinct harsh effects on the economy, health and well being of the nations that have been brought up to serve as dump sites. This matter has put the issue of social inequity in the light. The problem of the distribution of environmental hazards has been lopsidedly pushed towards the weaker nations, whilst leaving richer nations away from the problem that they have created. Given the ill conditions of their consumption patterns – their poor economic abilities render the people residing in such area the tendency to consume less than the population in rich countries – they bear the brunt of having to accommodate industrial wastes which have been ironically not produced and consumed within their countries (Anderton, 1994, pp. 29-248). Thus, in such matters, cleaning your own mess does not count. Racism and the logic of whoever stays stronger gain the upper hand (Anderton, 1994, pp. 29-248). Thus, the more powerful a state can be, the easier they can get to bend laws against the will of weaker nations and their inhabitants not mindful of the harmful effects it might render them. Much of the contradiction and irony lie in the fact that as much as human beings benefit largely from the blessings that the environment and its natural resources has bestowed upon them, humans are the first to be blamed from the hastening process of its depletion. More than an issue of high consumption in industrialized nations, the powerful leaders of the world have not devised a way towards proper disposal of their wastes. Industrial wastes have been dumped haphazardly, thus contaminating the environment and gravely affect natural resources. Environmental injustice is even more highlighted with the fact that the country who generates more wastes, is generally the country who gets away with it by dumping their wastes somewhere else as a form of a â€Å"recyclable wastes† which in any way generate more environment toxins. In the guise of economic prosperity and austerity measures, environment suffers a lot. Rich countries dump industrial toxins as a form of generating more profit for trading their wastes. While developing and poor countries accept these wastes and use scrap materials because they are cheaper, unmindful of the harmful emissions they may release that can endanger their environment. Thus, though high-end consumption in industrialized countries may pose a threat to the environment, irresponsible dumping of the wastes generated through these consumptions serve more dangerous as the former. And if the international community does not make regulations on proper disposal of these wastes, environment is off to suffer gravely than ever. References Adeola, Francis. January 2000. Cross-National Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Issues. American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 43 No. 4. Alter, Harvey. August 1994. Controlling International Trade in Wastes. Anderton, Douglas. et al. May 1994. Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping. Demography. Vol. 31, No. 2.